Conservatism, 1979 and the party ends………………

Conservatism, 1979 and the party ends  

The Conservative Party is the oldest British political party. It is a party of survival, of establishment and the balancing of the status quo.2 It has demonstrated an ability to adapt and develop, when necessary, yet has retained an identity that is steeped in the fundamental principle that society is an organic entity that searches for a natural order. 

Conservatism dictates that government’s primary role is the “maintenance of the institutional structure of society”3 where within lies an arena of stability, order and structure. Within these parameters of order, the individual will be given the opportunity to be able to fulfil their potential in a harmony and in peace. JS Mill may have described the Conservative Party as the “stupidest party”4 but his point reflects the soul of Conservatism as a non ideological beast. It has historically demonstrated a fundamental distrust of grand revolutionary change and as Conservative politician Walter Elliot noted, Conservatism represented, “an observation of life and not a priori reasoning”.5 

Conservatism in its essence is complex – it does not adhere to one set of rationale, to a doctrine to a belief system. It has evolved and nurtured to be able to survive and to sustain a society – to enable the entrepreneur, the individual to flourish within a framework of solidity and natural order. It maintains that society is based on a system of “overlapping networks” and relationships that bind society together and through order create individual opportunity and freedoms.6 This has enabled Conservatism to survive and indeed to thrive in British society that has not seen revolution or mass civil disobedience. 

This, “supreme old bourgeois party” Andrew Gamble argues, “always took great pride in distancing itself from the most characteristic expression of bourgeoisie ideology” – identifying itself with the concepts of necessary social intervention, the understanding of community and of a unity reflected in a paternalism of state.7 This contrasts intrinsically with Conservatisms innate mistrust and distaste of the liberal and the proliferation of laissez faire politics. 

Liberalism questions and thereby undermines, “the authority of established institutions”8 - prioritising the cause of the individual, thereby promoting conflict between the classes and increasing the risk of instability. Gamble argues that property rights and the continuation of the union lie at the heart of the Conservative tradition – not the preserve of a free market and the enrichment of the individual. Conservatism aims to maintain the status quo and to be, as Winston Churchill described, a “party of great, vested interests banded together in a formidable confederation.”9 

Gamble argues this attitude and sense of a party can only be maintained by being the, “party of protection”.10 In this he argues that Conservatism understands that in order for commerce, trade and prosperity to be maintained, society has to look to maintain those elements, the poor, the sick and the vulnerable, within the borders of society and ultimately the nation to be seen as one whole entity. 

But the Conservative party has been transformed – post 1945 it represented a party that adhered to a consensus, which understood the challenges that faced a nation on the brink and looked at the greater good. Consensus politics did not merge party ideology or indeed the party’s faithful, but pragmatism held sway. A Keynesian model of liberal economic policies was adopted; a pursuit of a mixed economy embraced and the drive for welfare reform enhanced. This was achieved in a political arena where the role of the trade union movement was seen as a positive one, which actually enhanced equality and social cohesion.17 Most importantly, any economic or social reform must embrace “human relations”18 and the cooperation of the workforce. Government must implement policy whilst considering consequences to the worker in the factory or in the field. The political consensus enhanced the desire for cooperation and a drive for “industrial democracy” – a humanistic approach to economic reform and industrial planning.19 

So, a key question is - how did this policy change? 

Correlli Barnett argues that the consensus politics lead to non-conviction and stagnated government policy. He argues that, 

“In October 1951 a Labour Government which did not really believe in socialism had been replaced by a Conservative Government which did not really believe in free market competition”20 

Barnett argues that Britain was crippled due to poor management, a poor work ethic and the pervasive argument of the pursuit of the “unshootable sacred cow” of the pursuit of full employment and “artificially maintained by state puffed inflation.”21 

British productivity was poor due to stifling trade union law and bargaining power, allowing a steady increase in wages and prices at the expense of profitability. A chronic lack of investment in innovative technology and training saw a workforce under motivated and de-motivated. Britain was a stumbling post war wreck, clinging on to pre- war imperial glories and lost in the modern world. There was “manure a plenty” Barnett argues for a government to clear and drive home economic and social reform. 

For some such as Enoch Powell economic reform was the crucial element in post war Britain and a Conservative party had to embrace it root and branch – economic planning was the key and a shift from a pursuit of full employment a priority. 

In this the key element was the control and supply of money in society – 

For a shift from the utopian policy of full employment there was a need to embrace the freedoms of the market, a firm grip on public expenditure and the freeing the government from “its need to interfere in matters that were not directly related to economic.”22 For Powell capitalism was natural and organic, an embrace of the invisible hand and a return to natural state of order and hierarchy. 

Powell was campaigning against what he saw as the “betrayal of the free market”23 in the 1950’s but it was to be 1974 before ideological change was to take root and branch hold on Conservatism. 

A key area of research is the sea change of Edward Heath’s economic policies in 1972 and the subsequent challenge to the unions; “Who governs Britain.” Upon coming to power Heath had attempted radicalism in economic reform and an introduction to a more liberal, economic order. This he decided had failed and he abandoned them and shifted policy back to his natural political stance of “rational discussion, modernization and planning.”24 

This proved for Heath to be a disaster. His “U-turn” period for a pragmatic politician may have seemed prudent and sensible, but in the context of militant trade unionism it was seen as weakness. Heath was to introduce policies to placate union activism that were “further to the left than any other previous Conservative government”25 - even though there was no dissent within a cabinet that included Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph, Heath was now seen to pander to union activity, who subsequently rejected these new policies.26 Heath was defeated in 1974 and a new dawn for Conservatism was to emerge Thatcherism. 

Keith Joseph stated famously in 1975, 

“It was only in April 1974 that I was converted to Conservatism. I had thought I was a Conservative but now I see that I was not one at all.” 31 

It was from this point that the Conservative party would not back down, it would “ride out the consequences” 32 and it would show its mettle when incorporating economic reform. Thatcher’s victory in 1979 ushered in a new period of economic and social conditioning. Thatcher, unlike Heath, would not turn, would accept the economic consequences of radicalism and would fulfil the ambitions of a new Tory generation. 

This generation were disciples of Enoch Powell, of the economics of Adam Smith, Hayek and Friedman, of the control of money supply, the determination to control inflation at seemingly all cost and the pursuit of individual wealth and prosperity. The chief lieutenants of these ideologically driven policies were Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher. 

Thatcher understood the nature of her task and was well in tune with her enemies to revolutionary success. Economic and not social control of society was targeted- in order to liberate the market and create individual freedoms harsh decisions would have to be made ultimately and militant opposition defeated. 

Thatcher understood her enemies well – the enemy without was Galtieri and the enemy within had traditionally been the NUM. This was the organisation that had brought down Heath – it was not to be her down fall. As Seamus Milne argues, 

“Britain’s ruling class has its folk memories, too, and miners emerging from the bowels of the earth to demand their rights touch a raw nerve.33” 

To implement economic reform the public utilities would have to be transformed, nationalized industries privatised, funding of education, housing, health, and social security questioned and challenged, the control of inflation targeted but the key to the administrations success would be the targeting and defeat of the “entire trade union movement.”34 To succeed in developing economic reform, Andrew Gamble argues that Thatcherism needed to challenge “the existing state” – the existing compromise over the Welfare State, the existing compromise over health now could not be tolerated. To enable reform and to seek freedom for the economy, the state mechanism must be strong – “to create a free economy and a strong state.”35 

These mechanisms of strength would enable the state to challenge the institutions which reflected its greatest challenge – the unions and ultimately the national National Union of Miners. Defeat them and a symbolic nemesis would be buried, allowing the radical change of the Conservative party to continue. Conservatism is a reflection of historic British political ideals – at its core it maintains an almost intrinsic ability to judge the nature of the body politic and is flexible when ultimately challenged. The Conservative will adhere to policies that create wealth, to reward enterprise and free choice – but as Francis Pym argues, 

“Government cannot neglect social policy for one reason. No matter what happens in the world around us, there is s permanent need for Britain to remain a harmonious nation, united within herself.”36 

Pym agues that there are periods when we will not be as prosperous as each other, or indeed other nations, but we will be living together, sharing ideals and needing to get on with each other – averting social discontent and indeed revolution, by allowing a broad agreement. “On the nature of our society and a belief that it conforms to the prevailing concepts of fairness and justice.”37 

Pym’s reflections of a “Tory Wet” are really those of the traditional core of the party. Marginalised as light weight and indecisive, they were to become a by word for those, like Heath, who bowed down to the union, who U-turned at times of crisis and who appeased when challenged. This was not to happen under Thatcher. 

Thatcher, argues Francis Beckett, represents the fault line of British political generations. She represented a “watershed” when the old settlement of post war Britain, instilled by Atlee, but embraced by successive Conservative regimes was shattered. The illusion of consensus was wiped away as antagonism, steely determination and the ability to confront and most importantly to win was prerequisite. She was to avenge for previous Conservative weakness as Beckett argues that, 

“In 1979 it looked as though one aspect of Thatcher policy would be an attempt to gain revenge on the miners for their defeat of Edward Heath I 1974, pour encourager les autres”.38 

Post 1979 the Conservative party dies at the altar of neoliberalism.